

confusing—in the very most brilliant of neon ways. Simple arrows cut from coroplast or some similar substance, then tied to the lamp poles and traffic posts of the London streets. Arrows which point but say nothing of where they lead—revealing, of course, that directions are only useful if you already know where you want to go. Are such pointers not always, then, symbols of displacement—the arrow always indicating exactly where you are not...not yet, until you follow the dotted imaginary line? And multiple arrows for exactly the multiplicity of places where we are not—the possibilities of where to go have as their limit only the awareness that we are already somewhere, and that somewhere, then, is the only place denied. Wherever you are, shouldn't you really be looking to go somewhere else instead? Anywhere else perhaps...just follow the neon signs.



Fig. 8-1, Committee, *Project Concerning some Fluorescent Signage*
(*Curtain Road, go every which way, 11.02.05*), 2005.

But that, of course, is exactly the point. This is not the oft-lauded posthuman solution first suggested by Katherine Hayles, in which patterns of randomness begin to emerge in response to uncertainty;² this rather is a randomness of pattern itself, a superfluity of pattern, too many options to

perhaps know exactly which pointer to follow. This is less an intervention than it is an interference pattern, a multiplicity of maps brought into a real-size urban space. For what is a sign if not itself a map of sorts, a node that tells you precisely where within the map you might begin to look for yourself? A real life, world-sized map of exactly the same nature as Borges hypothesized. For it was Borges who spoke of the map as large as the territory it represented, but Committee has constructed precisely several such maps, each superimposed over the next, a mash-up of imagined geography waiting to be engaged, disentangled or ignored.³



Fig. 8-2, Committee, *Project Concerning some Fluorescent Signage*
(*Curtain Road, go every which way, 11.02.05*), 2005.

Hyper-urban, one might say, as the excessive organization of space yields to complete disorganization, not of geography, but rather of perspective. And, one might well interrogate fluorescence itself in such an encounter, for when artificial colours begin to render the landscape, something begins to happen to our sense of self-placement. When two-dimensional signage dictates our possible ways of navigating three-dimensional space, is there not a common denominator of the lowest neon sort in play? Like the neon itself, here rendered ironically in black and

white as if to suggest that the colouring was, in any case, superfluous. From any given angle, one sees some signs but not others—from the front, or from behind, an arrow is nothing of the sort—instead reduced to the width of the material upon which it is printed. All maps—signs included—are devoid of anything but an *imaginary* depth. One can see it any way one wants, in other words, and not limited to a singular directive either. Here the arrows point everywhere and nowhere: the arrows one sees, the arrows one does not see, the arrows one ignores... until finally one just goes about one's way the same as one would have anyways—but changed, even if perhaps only a little, even if just for the sake of saying so—changed, in the end, by committee.

Perspectival Concessions

If we are to begin with an observation we know to be true—or one which if we doubt its truth or certainty we are at least willing to wager a momentary investment in its suspension—such an observation might well take the form of a simple assertion such as: "there are multiple ways of looking at any given phenomenon." We know this from a number of sources: from postmodern plurality to optical parallax; scientific paradox to simple diversity of perceptual or social or cultural or political bias. In other words, despite the social and philosophical desire for truth, we know already in advance that such a desire must allow for the very real multiplicity of perspectives brought into the world by individuals themselves.

At the same time, however, for such an observation to remain faithful to itself, it must also allow for the perspective from which only one way of looking is possible. It must, in other words, allow for perspectives from which certain other perspectives might be disallowed. And, in fact, it itself *is* one such way since the very assertion is a speaking of multiplicity in singularly-constitutive language. One might excuse this as merely a "way of speaking," an instance of rhetoric gone awry, or even as a meta-perspective which reconciles disparity in the name of singular understanding—yet such an excuse will always itself be also merely one more way of looking.

The first necessary concession, then, of perspectival speculation is that no singular perspective can exhaust the set of possible perspectives on the question itself—including the perspective that pretends to authoritatively insist on precisely such a formulation. Every constituted perspective, in other words, finds itself in the awkward position of having to admit to its own limitations, to concede, in the end, to the possibility—indeed the

necessity—of exactly its counter-thesis, its antithesis, its ignored and forgotten and incompatible opposite. Any given perspective is dependent on the disappearance of other possible perspectives, and in this every appearance has as its condition a sacrifice of disappeared possibility.

Optical Allusions

This can be put more simply by suggesting that perspective is always dependent, not on the constituted appearance that presents itself, but on the unconstituted disappearances that precisely are not presented. And, this is to emphasize the basic fact that perception has ghosts of its own, spectres which form the very structural conditions of observation in the first instance. The condition of seeing an object is that one is able to excerpt such an object from its contextual surroundings, such as to constitute it as a visually independent entity. Or, to put it differently, this condition is also that of looking in a certain direction, allowing one's gaze to focus or wander—as the head turns, new scenes present themselves while the previously viewed world is, in turn, blocked from view. With each view, a different iteration, a different set of ghosts, a different set of disappearances as that which provides the darkened sacrifice that allows for visual constitution in the first instance.

This is more than simple perspectival relativity however, for the consequence of perceptual partiality is also a material relativity that ensures the world will always remain at least partially hidden, at least partially obscured, at least partially in the shadows of the perspectival gaze itself. We may fancy ourselves beings of appearance, critically assessing a diversity of perspectives in order to synthesize a simulated whole. The partiality of perspective, however, will ensure that we never fully leave the shadows of disappearance, will ensure in short that a fully apparent world is alone an impossibility for our visual formulations. And, if this seems tenuous, consider the perspective of Slavoj Žižek who insists that the superfluity of possible viewing perspectives on the world means that reality itself is ultimately compromised by our very participation within it—both a guarantee of subjective presence *and* a forced separation from the manifestation of reality itself. And this because, for Žižek, the Real "has no positive-substantial consistency, it is just the gap between the multitude of perspectives on it" (2006, 7).

Consequently, in a very literal sense, we—as beings who are perspectivally bound—always have a condition of not-perceiving placed onto, on top of, or in between our real-world interactions, chained physiologically and subjectively to this very "gap between perspectives"

itself:

...the reality I see is never “whole”—not because a large part of it eludes me, but because it contains a stain, a blind spot, which indicates my inclusion in it. (Žižek 2006, 17)

The most obvious example of this, of course, is our own physiological image, the very appearance of the self itself, which is forever denied us except through the reflective mediation of the mirror. And this is why, for Žižek, the Real cannot be approached or even properly understood or engaged with, but exists most intensely in precisely those areas obscured from vision—in the “blind spot” of perception. The blind spot writes out portions of the world, and not only the portions ignored as a result of perspectival living.




Fig. 8-3, Diagram for testing the location of the blind spot⁴

However, the case requires a rendering that is slightly more complex than Žižek allows, particularly when we take his allusion to the “blind spot” of perception literally. For the blind spot—physiologically speaking—is not merely a gap between perspectives, but an internal gap within the very mechanisms of perception itself. In this sense, the blind spot exists literally right in front of our eyes—or, more explicitly, exactly within the eye itself. To be clear, the blind spot is that area of the eye where the optic nerve passes through the retina, that unique area of the eye that is not light sensitive but instead is forever condemned to shadow.⁵ Here, where there is no perception, there is also no perspective—for in this scotoma, vision is literally ruptured by its own mechanism of perceiving.

And the optical allusion is important, for the conflation of perspectival and optical blindness—the second-order constitution of disappearance—is

also that which reveals a nuance to the question, namely that unless we knew otherwise we never would have guessed that such darkness penetrated our worldly vision. For just as our forward gaze is rarely bothered by its backwards blindness, so too does optics compensate for the darkness that is its own. The mind, in other words, fills in the blanks, constituting a world behind the gaze—a world of unseen, but supposedly accessible perspectives on the question—and a literal light spot in front of the eye. And in this—in this mental patching of disappearance—one must insist that there is a perceptual emergence that cannot properly be called real, nor perhaps even visual. Instead, this artificial appearance is precisely *simulated*—a hole in perspectival reality from which the imaginary itself explicitly emerges.

Blind Spotting the Imaginary

The blind spot can be seen, then, as an explicit manifestation of immaterial presence—a manifestation of disappearance itself—represented not through a positively constituted rendering of appearance, but rather more inevitably through its structural failure to ever constitute a fully comprehensive image—whether it be from one perspective or many. To reverse Žižek's formula, then, one would have to assert that reality—given its absence of “positive-substantial consistency”—would have its own blind spot in precisely *the presence of negative-insubstantial consistency* from which its own inaccessibility becomes impossible to itself, which is merely to say manifest.

And this makes sense since the blind spot is literally blind not because we spot it as an area where appearances are absent, but more literally because it is here, in the blind spot itself, that the mind begins its manifestation of the imaginary proper, filling in the blanks of the world which we fail to perceive. The blind spot is not—in other words—a one-way phenomenon. The blind spot is, instead, precisely a *screen*: that which guards the boundary between the real and the imaginary, maintaining the integrity of the illusion by loosing an imaginary gaze to patch up the gaps in a forever-incomplete optical rendering of the real. And the blind spot is (and must be) blind to itself as well, or else its manifest imaginary has not quite performed its task. Reality may live in the darkened gaps between perspectives and behind the optic plate, but it is precisely the imaginary that escapes from these constraints, filling in the ruptures of disappearance by manifesting immaterial appearances of its own. Consequently, due to the internal dynamic of ruptured vision—the gap within perception as well as perspective—it is not merely the case that the reality I see will never be

"whole," but more crucially: *the blind spot guarantees that every perspective on reality will be, at least partly, made-up.*

"Truth has the structure of a fiction..." (Žižek 2006, 60) and the experiential test of the blind spot is, in this case, ironically revealing, since our awareness of the blind spot is made visual through precisely the strategic hallucination of disappearance itself. The blind spot then, is where the visual imaginary lives, and the perceived world is where the imaginary thus manifests—on an ongoing basis—as the very premise of visual appearance itself. One could phrase this differently by suggesting that the blind spot is—in fact—the orifice from which the imaginary emerges, manifesting into the world at large.

‘Pataperceptions

The blind spot is nervous, of course, since it is precisely the optical nerve that blinds its perceptual disappearance, rupturing the retina in order to communicate light-sensitive information to the mind. And such darkness is binding, for when the gaze falls into the darkness of its blind spot, vision is rendered as exactly its antithesis—not, that is, visual at all, but explicitly hallucinatory. The black hole into which all light must fatefully—and faithfully—pass, the blind spot is also a protrusion of the imagination, and an imaginary protrusion at that.

Not only a blind spot, then, but also a light spot—a spotlight for the illuminated imaginary which then projects itself outward into the world at large. Doubled darkness—and upside down and backwards too. Perhaps the bat has always gotten it exactly right while we—blind to ourselves as we are—have been misled by the very imaginary nature of perception itself. Or is it just the opposite, and the in-built failing of mammalian eyes is itself the larger problem. The eyes of an octopus have no blind spots.⁶ Would this make them more imaginary than us, or less? A solid question, given our reliance on a visually constituted reality. Or, again, perhaps exactly not—not, that is, a solid question at all, but one whose face is of the most nebulously constituted visible contingency. What do we call an imaginary real, a real whose manifestation is filled with invisible holes—seemingly seamless until, upon closer scrutiny, we find multiple, incompatible, incongruent—yet no less self-propagating for their glossalalic nature—perspectives on the very most basic visual manifestation itself?

Are we bothered, then, by our inability to see, by the pervasive presence of darkness—that which is, ostensibly, our very condition of perception in the first instance? It is the darkness that is familiar, from

blind spots to imaginary monsters; demons and nightmares and personal insecurities alike. And—more importantly still—these manifestations of darkness are not in any way the nuanced instantiations of reality denied, but just the opposite: instances of the imaginary darkness out of which perception has always already grown in the first instance.

If there are blind spots—and we know (without knowing) that there are—then it means one thing only: the eyes were never eyes at all, but merely an excuse for the bleeding of imaginary darkness into the world of illuminated delirium, a world of partial truths, perspectival incompleteness and manifest hallucination as the signs of a world where we have always taken that singular and essential liberty of unintentionally filling in the visual blanks. For blind spots are not places that vision cannot reach, but exactly the opposite. The blind spot is a place of agreed upon rendering in opposing forms. The blind spot—in other words—is not blind at all, but ‘pataperceptual.’⁷ The blind spot is, in this sense, the physiological location of the visual imaginary—and reality merely the excuse for the light spots of hallucinatory manifestation.

The Parallax Differential

A formulation such as this has significant implications for the psychoanalytic understanding of self and subjectivity. For, above and beyond being creatures who can never fully authenticate our own positions in the world (the psychoanalytic imperative towards subjectivity as traumatic or alienated), these inversions also mean that we most explicitly are creatures whose positions in the world can be fully justified *on imaginary grounds*. If reality, then, is inaccessible because it lives in the gap between perspectives and perceptions, it is precisely the manifestations of imaginary being that complement this inaccessibility by presenting an alternative that can be immediately satisfied—an hallucinatory vision that is our guarantee of creative presence in the world. In other words, due to the imaginary grounding of our very presence in the world, we are not accountable to the real; instead, it is precisely the illusion of the real that sustains the ongoing manifestation of imaginary living, freeing perception and perspective from their representational debts.

This illusion of the real, however, requires more than simply the flat—planar—constitution of optical presence. As we know, two eyes are required for the perception of depth; the cross-referenced synthesis of doubled optical sightlines providing an amalgamated vision of a three-dimensional world. The brain synthesizes information from both eyes to allow for perception in three-dimensions, a phenomenon whose occurrence

is indebted to the parallax differential of vision itself.⁸ And yet the world is never actually perceived in three dimensions—it is another illusion, grown from the reconciliation of parallax differential. In other words, emerging from the incongruencies between left and right-sided vision is an explicitly three-dimensional imaginary: the basic interference pattern of optical discord.

The thesis that the Real is just the cut, the gap of inconsistency between the two appearances has [thus] to be supplemented by its opposite: appearance is the cut, the gap, between the two Reals, or, more precisely, *something that emerges in the gap that separates the Real from itself.* (Žižek 2006, 107)

What is missing from this (psychoanalytic) formulation, however, is the simple observation that none of this should strike us as particularly surprising. Much can be made of optical incongruence, but the simple fact of the matter is that we are exceptionally adept—each and every one of us—at negotiating the parallax view of our perceptual worlds. And, while we may not claim to understand the synthetic process of perceptual amalgamation, in many ways understanding is not even necessary because we continually live this amalgamation itself. Real or not, the emergence of appearance puts the emphasis on the *imaginary synthesis of perceptual incongruence* and not in any way on its failure to satisfy the conditions of understanding.

In many ways, it is by far preferable to frame such formulations as imaginary since—without pretense to authority or authenticity—the imaginary allows for the simultaneous presence of conflicting perspectives. To put this differently, one might say that while the imaginary can be seen as a real threat to reality (since reality has a stake in the truth of its presence) the inverse is not the case. In other words, while the imaginary can synthesize multiple and discordant perspectives and perceptions, it can also accommodate a non-synthesized version of multiplicity proper. And this is important because—as we have seen from our optical excursions—the simultaneous co-existence of conflicting (or incongruent) perspectives is, in fact, required for the perception of depth. And the fact that such perception is itself a synthetic cognitive extrapolation is no argument against its appearance in the first instance. In the words of Jean Baudrillard: "The real is born of a lack of imagination," and consequently the imagination itself (in optics and in psychoanalytics alike) cannot be held accountable to reality (or its absence) (1993, 33).

Two Blind Spots are Better than One

This can, however, be taken further still, particularly if we continue to emphasize the importance of disparity and discord as prerequisites for optical depth. For, since each of us has two eyes it should be self-evident that we each also have not simply one, but two blind spots—two perpetual instantings of imagined vision—and consequently also twice the imaginary proof of our perspectival presence. And the parallax differential between our blind spots is no less important than the perspectival displacement of the eyes. Here, the optical discord required for our perception of depth is echoed by the resonance patterns of blind spots themselves.

The result of this is a doubled rendering of precisely an imaginary world, no longer simply as the inability of the real to fully manifest but rather as the explicitly synthesized—imagined—interpolation of multiple and discordant perspectives, each of which already contains a kernel of the imaginary such that, when brought together, the result is—in no uncertain terms—exactly a perspective from which the imagination appears in three-dimensional form. To be more accurate, however, would be to insist that it is not merely a singular three-dimensional perspective that emerges in this instance, but two. Here, the doubling of imaginary rendering operates according to independent methods of synthesis, such as to—paradoxically—yield two perspectives on precisely the manifest imaginary itself.

First, the disjunction—the parallax—between our ocular perspectives on the world allows for the imaginary synthesis of three-dimensional space. To be clear, this synthesis occurs in the brain itself, amalgamating the disparate visual feeds from each eye into an optical representation of depth. It must, however, be insisted that we do not actually *see* depth—instead, the depth is precisely *imagined*, correlated, cross-referenced and processed—in other words, subject to a *process*. The perception of depth emerges as an interference pattern grown of the brain's electromagnetic synthesis of coherent optical stimuli.⁹

Second, the doubled manifestation of the visual imaginary—the cognitive hallucinations that fill in the blanks in front of the blind spots—also allow for an explicit manifestation of a three-dimensional space. This process is, however, slightly more abstract since it involves the overlapping ruptures of synthetic three-dimensional rendering by the two-dimensional pictures used to fill in the blanks. Because each eye—taken separately—is incapable of perceiving depth, these hallucinatory manifestations are by necessity bound to the same rules of engagement.

These two-dimensional holes in the assimilated perspective, however, are not cross-referenced along with other optical stimuli, for the simple reason that they occur in those areas of vision where there is no communication with the brain. Conceived of in isolation from the remainder of the visual field, however, these two two-dimensional renderings construct their own version of a three-dimensional field—in this case one that is not dependent on the cognitively-amalgamated rendering but is, instead, exactly a multi-dimensional blind spot—in essence, a blind sphere—which is itself imaginatively filled in (but not extrapolated) no less than the spots from which it grew.

Now, these two perspectives on a three-dimensional manifest imaginary are obviously neither congruent nor in competition with one another. There is no competition because they ultimately agree on the hallucinatory nature of the perceived world. There is no congruence because in each instance the respective perspectives are incapable of perceiving one another; incapable, in other words, of negotiating a communal forum for agreement. Instead, these perspectives are themselves overlapping—a quantum association emerges as the paradoxical co-existence of imaginary worlds takes on not simply an optical dynamic, but rather also an explicitly cognitive form. Between these iterations of the manifest imaginary, we too are perspectively doubled—thrown into the paradox of synthetic synthesis; a paradox of reality mashups and manifest imaginations whose imminent appearances place us, as individuals, in the world not once but twice. For we are not three-dimensional creatures; we are, in each instance, doubled two-dimensional creatures...and doubled again, but always, it seems, to the double-blind power of two.

Cross-Eyed Imaginaries

The imagination is clever, for it makes use of an always doubled perspective to ensure that its manifestation will go unnoticed...unnoticed, that is, until the blind lines are crossed, forming a strangely delirious grid—a parallax grid—and with it rendering in new key the optically manifest imaginary itself. For two grids make a wire frame cube and the wire frame imaginary worlds that ensue build from blind spots to blind spheres, veering ever more into their own delirious forms.

Facing a world that is unintelligible and problematic, our task is clear: we must make that world even more unintelligible, even more enigmatic. (Baudrillard 2000, 83)

A cleverly constructed parallax view could, in theory, render the subject blind—or throw the subject into a full-spectrum hallucination. This, since each eye has its blinded position, such that if each eye were to be subjected to this perspectival positioning, there would be no apparent scene to “fill in.” No assembly required, and yet the absence of assemblage yields no synthesis but only interference.




Fig. 8-4, Diagram for testing the effects of cross-eyed parallax¹⁰

But it does make sense—a parallax sense, which is to say two senses at the same time, two irreconcilable renderings of sensical constitution which then come together to make a third. Not a reconciled rendering but precisely an interference pattern, a patterned nonsensical rendering of synthetic and synthesized difference. And it can be so different than what we might otherwise expect because expectation itself has nothing to contribute to the blinded third eye's cross-eyed manifesto. For the illusion of depth is both synthesized and not—cross-wired until the parallax differential turns back on itself. And the real function of the three-dimensional gaze is not to give us a single perspective on the world, but rather to give us many. We are not three-dimensional creatures, as the parallax differential makes clear. Instead we are doubled two-dimensional creatures—everything else is an imagined extrapolation, a sensory and corporeal extension, and a fantastic protrusion. Two perspectives, multiplied and synthesized into synthetic ones and cross-eyed threes—these are the required elements for the finger sausage world—the strabismus, nerve-crossed, nervous crossing of imaginary perspectives that nevertheless yield a perspectival imaginary (or three) of their own. Patterned—nonsensically patterned—into visual existence itself.

‘Patholographics

If the real is disappearing, it is not because of a lack of it—on the contrary, there is too much of it. It is the excess of reality that puts an end to reality.
—Baudrillard 2000, 65-66

The secret is to oppose to the order of the real an absolutely imaginary realm...
—Baudrillard 1983, 119

Does hallucination contain a blind spot? Ostensibly it should, since it is subject to vision no less than legitimate manifestations of reality—and since reality has ostensibly already itself been relegated to the status of the non-perceived (if not, indeed, imagined). Or perhaps the case is even more extreme, and the hallucinatory precisely does not have a blind spot for the simple reason that it finds itself already constituted within the blind sphere of imaginary living, already a synthesis of the multiplicity of emergent realities that are brought from the darkness of synthetic amalgamation. In other words, already a series of connected blind spots, multi-dimensionally cross-constituted from the darkness of the imaginary mind. In either case, such a thesis has obvious problems, at least for the reason that it begins to seem entirely antithetical to the communally hallucinated world we have—it seems—already agreed to live in.

The free act in its abyss is unbearable, traumatic, so that when we accomplish an act out of freedom, in order to be able to bear it, we experience it as conditioned by some pathological motivation... a free act *cannot* be schematized, integrated into our experience; so, in order to schematize it, we have to “pathologize” it. (Žižek 2006, 92)

Then again, perhaps there is an unusual—awkward but undeniably enticing—correlation between precisely the hallucinatory and the pathological. For we are in fact talking about the manifest imaginary—in material depth, with all the discord a depth-dependent rendering obviously requires. It is pathological (at least in Žižek’s sense) because it is a real manifestation of unreality, unintegrated and unintegratable except as a series of imaginary perspectives on the world itself. Yet it is also hallucinatory—even holographic—because it is not in actual fact a synthesis at all—or at least not reducible to synthesis, and not accountable to the objective facts of the matter either.

Consequently, a question: what happens when ‘pataphysics meets pathology and the imaginary meets the holographic? Perhaps in this

instance, what we end up with is explicitly a theory of '*pathographics*' as the mashup of perspectival understanding, in all its various, discordant and incommensurable forms. Is this not, then, the question at hand? The question of nonsense interference patterns as those multiplicitous worlds that emerge from perspectival incongruity, blind-spotted hallucinatory invention and any other—any other—version of filling in the imaginary blanks?

And one must insist that, at least, there are many versions such a question might take. It takes two points to suggest a line; two lines to suggest a plane and two pilots to fly a plane through a three-dimensional landscape. And the discordant resonance of such worldly multiplicity leaves far too many options to synthesize down into an argumentative whole. No, it is the holes that are enticing, the blanks in the world itself that can be so easily filled in and reconstituted because they depend only on an activated imaginary, an engaged and sustained attempt to cross-eyes or synthesize. And, most compelling perhaps, is the simple observation that such has always been the case—for the imaginative reconstitution of worldly presence has always gone on behind the scenes, optical phantoms whose haunted landscapes we once mistook for real.

Now we know better, perhaps, for it is precisely these phantoms that form the holographics of perceptual constitution: from blind spots to finger sausages; parallax gaps to cross-eyed delusions. A hologram is a light-based rendering of interference—not in fact an image, even though it looks like one, but rather a cross-eyed and multiplied rendering of multiple imagined perspectives. And there is much at stake in entering into holographic discourse, for as enticing as the hologram may seem, it is only properly understood when broken into its component parts, dissected into its composite imaginaries—seen through the filter of its multiple blind spots themselves. For when we break the hologram—as is well known—we get a series of fragments, each of which contains an *entire* image of the whole. These are not, then, assimilated fragments that come together like puzzle pieces, but just the opposite—complete and self-sustaining perspectives on appearance itself.

And yet, this is not to say that each holographic fragment is equivalent, for the case is nothing of the sort. In fact, each fragment shows the same object, but from its own unique perspective—and the perspectives on the question, then, come together to form this interference pattern, an image with far greater optical depth than those taken simply from one perspective or another.¹¹ Thus, when the multiplicity of the question seems precisely overwhelming—when perspectives and blind spots and parallax renderings abound to the point of nonsensical excess—it is precisely the

interference patterns created among these proliferating hallucinatory possibilities that are then brought into focus, distilled into their own resonant frequencies. For even when synthesis—intellectual, perspectival, cognitive or otherwise—becomes impossible, there are always the possibilities for nonsense interference patterns as the holographic renderings of the parallax world.

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Notes

¹ If we consider aesthetics to be a (philosophically) superfluous perspective on consolidated (rational) questions, then this relationship would be duplicated in that between fluorescents and “regular” colours. In the sense that fluorescents are “unnatural” or synthetic, they belong to the realm of the “created” or “imaginary”—i.e. the aesthetic—an assertion that is made here in the spirit of textural provocation.

² According to Hayles, “an infusion of noise into a system can cause it to reorganize at a higher level of complexity” (1999, 25).

³ For the story of the map the size of the territory it represents, see Jorge Luis Borges, “On Exactitude in Science,” in *Collected Fictions*.

⁴ By holding one’s face close to the diagram, closing one eye and focusing on the number furthest to the opposite side of one’s face (for example by closing one’s right eye and focusing on number 4) one will notice a white gap remaining where other numbers should ostensibly appear.

⁵ See Wikipedia, “Blind Spot (Vision).”

⁶ The physiology of the octopus eye is such that the optic nerve is not required to rupture the retinal plate in order to communicate visual information to the brain. In essence the scotoma present in mammalian eyes is absent in those of the octopus. Whether this is an advantage or a failing is, of course, a matter of perspective. See Shwab 2003, 812.

⁷ This term is derived from ‘pataphysics—“the science of imaginary solutions”—invented by the French writer Alfred Jarry. With Jarry’s definition in mind, ‘pataperception might be defined as “the observation of imaginary appearances.” See Jarry 1980, 32. The inclusion of the apostrophe at the beginning of the word was mandated by Jarry to avoid possible puns, such as “*patte à physique* (leg of physics), ... *pas ta physique* (‘not your physics’), or maybe “*Pâte à physique*” (‘physics-dough’).” See Wikipedia, “Pataphysics.”

⁸ Parallax is “the apparent displacement of an object (the shift of its position against a background), caused by a change in observational position that provides a new line of sight” (Žižek 2006, 17). What Žižek seems to miss, however, is (as before) the *optical allusion* of parallax, which is to say the fact that our eyes themselves are offset such that we are continually adapting to the parallax differential in our own vision. The “shift in position,” that Žižek describes, consequently, is already of *second-order* status—and in such a model there are four, rather than two, perspectives in play.

⁹ The term “electromagnetic synthesis” is one I borrow from the artist Doug Jarvis, who speaks to this phenomenon in a different context as responsible for potential confluences of optic, magnetic, sonic and kinesthetic spectrums.

¹⁰ By crossing one’s eyes and looking at this diagram, one will perceive the “illusion” of a third segment to the rendering. This illusion is typically demonstrating by pointing one’s index fingers at each other and crossing one’s eyes, in which instance a “sausage finger” appears in the space between the two

outreached digits. Hence the term "sausage-finger trick." See Cool Optical Illusions, "Sausage Finger Trick."

¹¹ When one breaks a hologram, the result is that each broken shard contains an image of the whole, but from its own perspectival viewing angle. In this, one must concede that a hologram is an amalgamation of perspectival incongruities, brought together to construct a more-than-two-dimensional image. See Sapan.